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We have assessed the determinants of the choice of integration, relational contracting (keiretsu sourcing)
and market sourcing by seven Japanese automobile manufacturers (OEMs) with respect to 54 components
in light of contract economics. Our major findings are the following. First, the specificity and interdependency
of a component significantly promotes vertical integration over keiretsu and keiretsu over market,
consistent with transaction cost economics. Second, interdependency is a more important consideration
for the former choice than for the latter choice, and the reverse is the case for specificity. This suggests
that the hold-up risk due to specific investment can be often effectively controlled by a relational contracting
based on keiretsu sourcing, while accommodating non-contractible design changes may often require
vertical integration. Third, while higher testability of a component makes the effects of specificity
significantly smaller, it also promotes the choice of keiretsu sourcing over market sourcing. One interpretation
of this last result is that while higher testability improves the contractibility of the component with
high specificity, it simultaneously enhances the advantage of keiretsu sourcing since it provides more
opportunities for the supplier to explore new information for a collaborative exploitation with an OEM.
Sadao Nagaoka
Hitotsubashi University
















This paper empirically examines the determinants of the boundaries of the firm, focusing on the 
Japanese auto industry. Since Coase’s (1937) seminal work, the boundaries of the firm have 
long been one of most challenging issues for researchers, and the auto industry has been one of 
the most investigated industries.
1 A seminal paper based on a transaction cost view of the firm 
boundary is Monteverde and Teece (1982), which demonstrated transaction cost, which was 
measured by engineering efforts and firm-specificity to design components, mattered for the 
vertical integration decision by OEMs (GM and Ford)
2. This paper extends their analysis in 
three directions. First, for the dependent variable, in addition to the two choices (make internally 
or buy from the market), we introduce the third choice, “buy from affiliated (“keiretsu”) 
suppliers.” This sourcing from keiretsu seems to be a good example of relational contracting, 
which earlier literature on transaction cost economics does not pay much attention (see 
Williamson (1975)), but the importance of which is now well recognized (see Williamson 
(1985) and Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002)). Since keiretsu sourcing accounts for a major 
part of the component procurements by Japanese auto industry (more than 50% of the 
procurements of the components under this study for Toyota, Nissan and Honda), the dataset of 
the Japanese auto industry provide unique opportunities for us to examine the choice of 
integration and relational contracting simultaneously.   
Second, for independent variables, we introduce a set of new variables on component 
characteristics based on their detailed survey
3, to measure multiple dimensions of contracting 
                                                  
1  For example, GM’s acquisition of Fisher Body was analyzed by Klein, Crawford and Alchian 
(1978), Hart (1989), and Langlois and Robertson (1995). 
2  See also Masten (1984) for the study of the Aerospace Industry and Masten, Meehan and Snyder 
(1989) for the study distinguishing physical and human capital investment on the U.S. auto industry.    
3  We would like to thank the respondents to our questionnaire survey used in this research, Kentaro 
Nobeoka and Seiji Manabe, who jointly designed and carried out the survey, and our research 
assistants, Yangjoong Yun and Chikako Takanashi, who helped us build up the dataset.   3
environment (the specificity, interdependency and testability of a component) and to strengthen 
controls on missing variables (the complexity, safety, customer-value, and firm-standard of a 
component). The availability of these new variables allows us to inquire new questions, for an 
example, as to whether higher testability of a component enables more contracting choice for 
supplying a component with high specificity. Third, we use a set of time series data of the 
Japanese auto industry, which we have built up to cover the make-or-buy decisions of 7 OEMs 
on 54 types of components for almost two decades from 1984 to 2002.   
  The organization of this paper is the following. Section 2 provides theoretical 
framework for the organizational and contract choice for the efficient supply of a component in 
the automobile industry. Section 3 describes econometric model and data, and section 4 presents 
estimation results. Section 5 concludes.     
2. Theoretical Framework 
In this section we present a (reduced form) theoretical framework for the organizational and 
contract choice for efficient supply of a component in the automobile industry, drawing on the 
insights from the transaction cost economics (see Williamson (1975, 1985)) and the property 
rights theory(see Grossman and Hart (1986)), so as to derive testable propositions. Efficient 
coordination of design activities between an OEM and a component supplier, the quality 
assurance of the components manufactured, and their low cost are the important determinants 
for the efficiency of component supply. In the case of automobile industry, efficient 
coordination with an OEM in design is a particularly important factor, since an automobile is a 
system product, the performance of which depends critically on how much each key component 
is designed in an integrative manner for a particular vehicle model. On the same ground, the 
quality assurance in manufacturing is critical, since a failure of one key component can make 
the entire automobile non-functional. To achieve efficiency in these terms, an OEM has the   4
organizational choice between integration and non-integration as well as the contract choice 
between non-keiretsu (short-term
4) contracting and keiretsu (relational or long-term) contracting 
(see Figure 1, which is based on Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002))
5.  
                ( F i g u r e   1 )  
Formally, let us denote integration or make choice by the combination of y=1 and z=0, 
keiretsu or relational contracting choice by y=0 and z=1, and the market (or non-keiretsu) 
contracting choice by y=0 and z=0. We hypothesize that higher design specificity (s) of a 
component as well as higher interdependency (θ ) between the component and the other 
components in design would increase the value of vertical integration of that component 
production. High design specificity would involve the tangible or intangible investment specific 
to the OEM by the supplier, which is subject to hold-up risk. High interdependency in design 
would require frequent and extensive negotiations with a supplier when an OEM wishes to 
change the design of its components, which would not be contractible ex-ante. Vertical 
integration has advantages in promoting relation-specific investment and for accommodating 
non-contractible design changes (see Bajari and Tadelis (2001) and Tadelis (2002)). Sourcing 
from keiretsu would have a similar but attenuated effect on the value of the component, since 
design change, for an example, will still involve negotiations between two firms. Thus, we 
hypothesize that the value of a component net of design cost is enhanced by vertical integration 
or keiretsu sourcing, the degree of which increases with the specificity and interdependency of 
the component: 
ε μ θ β θ β β θ + + + + + + = ) )( 1 ( ) , , ; , ( 3 2 1 0 z y s s a v t s z y v                 ( 1 )  
                                                  
4  Most contracts with non-keiretsu suppliers are long-term (continues for more than 10 years), but 
could be regarded as shorter-term (higher probability of discontinuity of transaction) in comparison 
with those with keiretsu suppliers. 
5  There is a potential choice of spot employment. Although such possibility may also be important, 
we do not consider this choice in this paper.       5
, where  0 , 0 , 0 , 0 2 1 0 > > > > β β a v  ,  1 0 < < μ and  ε  is a random variable. We may 
expect 0 3 > β , given that the marginal effect of interdependency is likely to be larger, the 
higher the specificity of the component is.   
  The cost function for the component supply consists of the manufacturing cost and the 
quality assurance cost net of the value from quality improvement. The manufacturing cost is 
given by 
  ) ( 1 0 z y c c κ + +                      ( 2 )  
, which is the highest when integration is chosen ( 1 0 c c + ), reflecting the effect of the loss of 
ownership interest in cost reduction (internal procurement is cost-based). Sourcing from a 
keiretsu supplier would also provide smaller incentive for cost-reduction, compared to sourcing 
from the market, due to limited competition ( 1 < <κ o ).  
The cost of quality assurance would matter especially when the testability of the 
component is low and the component is specific to the OEM. We assume that as testability 
improves (the cost of testing becomes lower), the cost of quality assurance declines to zero. For 
a given level of testability, the cost of quality assurance would be higher for a spot supplier 
which would have the motivation to reduce the quality of the component to be supplied when it 
is effective for saving cost. A relational contracting could constrain the incentive for such 
quality-degradation, since once such conduct would be uncovered, the rent from long-term 
relationship would be lost (Shapiro (1983)). In vertical integration, the provision of a strong 
incentive to an employee for cost-reduction would not be used, so as to avoid creating an 
incentive for compromising quality due to multitasking (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) for a 
theory and Slade (1996) for an empirical analysis). Given these considerations, we can 
hypothesize that the cost of quality assurance increases with specificity, declines with testability 
and is reduced by vertical integration or relational contracting:     6
t z y s c / )} ( 1 ){ 1 ( 2 ρ δ λ + − +                          ( 3 )  
with  0 , > ρ δ , with  ρ   indicating the efficiency of keiretsu relative to vertical integration for 
quality assurance. 
Finally, we take into account the quality improvement based on the collaboration 
between a supplier (gathering information useful for quality improvement) and an OEM (its 
implementation)
 6. We assume that a vertically integrated supplier does not engage in voluntary 
efforts for gathering information for quality improvement, due to its weak incentive for such 
information exploration (the assignment of the patent right of an employee inventor to a firm in 
Agion and Tirole (1994) and the absence of recourse when the upstream party reneges in Baker, 
Gibbons and Murphy (2002)). A supplier external to the OEM would have an incentive to do 
such information exploration. In addition, such information can be more easily shared with the 
OEM when it is a keiretsu supplier than when it is an independent supplier, since relational 
contracting enables non-contractible efforts being rewarded ex-post. In addition, we assume that 
high testability of the component would create more opportunities for a supplier to discover 
information useful for improving the quality of the component. Given these considerations, the 
value of quality improvement enabled by the information discovered by a supplier is given by   
) 1 ( z y bt φ + − ,                                                     ( 4 )  
with  0 , > φ b .  
The efficient organizational and contractual choice is given by 
Maxy,z  ) , , ; , ( ) , , ; , ( t s z y c t s z y v w θ θ − =    
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6  See Barzel (1982) for the effects of measurement cost on the choice of organizational or 
contractual choice. Also see Baker and Hubbard (2003) for the effects of information availability on 
the choice of organizational or contractual choice.     7
, where  η   is a random variable. The choices are over vertical integration, keiretsu and market: 
(y,z)={(1,0),(0,1), (0,0)}. Given the above analytical framework, we can derive the following 
three propositions on the effects of component characteristics on organizational and contractual 
choice, using sourcing from keiretsu as the base.   
 
Proposition 1 (Effect of Specificity) 
We would observe more vertical integration relative to keiretsu sourcing and more keiretsu 
sourcing relative to market sourcing for a component with higher specificity (s). These effects 
decline with testability.   
(Proof)  We  have  
0 / ) ( / 2 3 1
2 > + + = ∂ ∂ ∂ t c a y s w λδ θ β β                      ( 6 . 1 )  
0 / ) ( / 2 3 1
2 > + + = ∂ ∂ ∂ t c a z s w λδρ μ θ β β                    ( 6 . 2 )  
Subtracting, we have 
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Proposition 2 (Effect of interdependency) 
We would observe more vertical integration relative to keiretsu and more keiretsu sourcing  
relative to market sourcing for a component with higher interdependency (θ ).These effects of 
interdependency would increase with specificity (s). 
(Proof) We have the following results for the effect of interdependency (θ ). 
0 ) ( / 3 2
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0 ) ( / 3 2
2 > + = ∂ ∂ ∂ μ β β θ s a z w                    ( 7 . 2 )  
Proposition 3 (Effect of Testability)   8
We would observe less vertical integration relative to keiretsu as the testability of the component 
increases. We can observe more keiretsu sourcing relative to market sourcing as the testability 
of the component increases if the quality improvement based on information sharing effect is 
important.   
(Proof)  0 / ) 1 ( /
2
2
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2 / ) 1 ( /                         ( 8 . 2 )  
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We can depict the choice for each combination of the component characteristics in the 
parameter space. The dividing lines for choices are characterized in the following manner, 
assuming their existence. 
The dividing line between vertical integration and keiretsu (V-K line): 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( } / ) 1 ( ){ 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 2 3 2 1 κ φ ρ δ λ μ θ β θ β β − = + − − + + − + + + c bt t s c s s a (9.1), 
The dividing line between keiretsu and market (K-M line): 
κ φ δρ λ μ θ β θ β β 1 2 3 2 1 ) / )( 1 ( ) 1 ( c bt t s c s s a = + + + + + +                   ( 9 . 2 ) ,  
The dividing line between market and vertical integration (M-V line):  
1 2 3 2 1 / ) 1 ( ) 1 ( c bt t s c s s a = − + + + + + δ λ θ β θ β β                          ( 9 . 3 )  
Figure 2 and 3 provide two examples of the patterns of choices with specificity and 
interdependency represented by horizontal and vertical axes (assuming a given testability). 
Since the specificity and interdependency of a component enhance the value of vertical 
integration more than that of keiretsu over market sourcing (that is,  1 0 < < μ ), we may expect 
a monotonic change of the choices from market to keiretsu, and then to vertical integration as 
the specificity and interdependency of a component increases. This would be indeed the case 
when keiretsu’s relative advantage in enhancing the value of design is larger than its relative   9
manufacturing cost disadvantage ( κ μ > ) and the effects of organizational choice on quality 
assurance and on sharing new information on quality improvement are negligible ( 0 = = b δ ). 
In such case, the choices over three organizational choices are monotonically sorted by either 
specificity or interdependency, as in Figure 2, since the two lines (V-K line and K-B line) are 
parallel to each other.   
                  ( F i g u r e   2 )  
More generally, however, such monotonic relationship does not hold. We may observe 
a jump from market sourcing to vertical integration as specificity or interdependency increases. 
For simplicity, let us assume that quality assurance is important ( 0 > δ ) and keiretsu and 
vertical integration can equally achieve the efficiency of quality assurance ( 1 = ρ ) and there is 
no effect of information sharing ( 0 = b ). In this case the dividing line between vertical 
integration and keiretsu (V-K line) does not shift asδ  increases. However, the dividing line 
between market and keiretsu (K-M line) rotates in the clock-wise in Figure 3. As a result, the 
choice can make a “jump” from market sourcing to vertical integration in the region where 
specificity is low and interdependency is high as either variable has a higher value.  As 
testability increases, the keiretsu region may expand in both upward and downward directions, 
due to increasing contractibility and increasing value of information sharing (see (8.3) and 
(8.2)).  
(Figure 3)     
3. Econometric Model and Data 
In light of the above three propositions, we evaluate the choice of the three modes of component 
transactions between 7 Japanese OEMs and their suppliers (including in-house divisions) with 
respect to 54 major components (see Table A2 in the Appendix) for 7 every-three years from 
1984 to 2002. The independent variables on the engineering characteristics of the components   10
are constructed from a questionnaire survey of the automobile engineers at four Japanese OEMs 
on the detailed characteristics of the components (see Table A3 in the Appendix).A detailed 
description and the sources of the data are provided in Appendix 1, including how these variables 
were measured.  
The basic econometric model we employ is the multinomial logistic model with the 
dominant choice of each OEM firm i in procuring a component j in time t among the three 
alternative transaction modes (vertical integration, keiretsu sourcing, market sourcing
7) as the 
dependent variable. We also report the results based on the ordinary least squares focusing on 
the choice of two alternatives in terms of the difference of procurement shares (vertical 
integration vs. keiretsu sourcing, and keiretsu sourcing vs. market sourcing) in Appendix 2. As 
shown in Figure 4, a firm often combines two or even three modes in procuring a component. 
For an example, 22% of the procurements involve both keiretsu sourcing and market sourcing, 
and 3% of the contracts involve all three modes. However, we have specified only one of them 
as the primary choice which is the transaction mode that supplies most, following Monteverde 
and Teece (1982). We use the choice of keiretsu sourcing as the base and evaluate the 
determinants of the choices of market sourcing and vertical integration relative to keiretsu 
sourcing in our multinomial estimation, to be consistent with the above propositions.   
              ( F i g u r e   4 )  
Firm i chooses one of the three organizational or contract choices for each component 
j for year t, according to the following probability function: 
) , , ,
, , int , ( ) Pr(
, , ,
, , ,
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    ( 1 0 )  
Since our data of the component characteristics are available for only recent years (survey was 
                                                  
7  See Appendix 1 for the operational definition of keiretsu suppliers.   11
conducted in 2003 and 2004. Note, however, that these characteristics change only gradually 
over time), the estimation is essentially cross-section, although we do have the variations of the 
organizational or contract choices of each component and that of production volume of the 
OEMs over time.   
  Our primary explanatory variables are specificity,  interdependency, and testability. 
The variable specificity constructed from the questionnaire survey indicates how the design 
criteria and the interfaces of the component is specific to the firm
8 . The variable 
interdependency indicates the degree of relatedness with the other components in terms of 
design, structure, function, and manufacturing. The variable testability represents how easily the 
component can be tested as a stand-alone object, and whether it can be developed and 
experimented on the stand-alone basis.   
  Let us move on to control variables, which may affect the contractual or organizational 
choice and have correlation with the above independent variables. We introduce four variables 
indicating the characteristics of components as well as two variables indicating the scale and 
stability of OEMs’ production, in addition to firm and year fixed effects (dummies). The 
variable complexity indicates the level of technology used for the component, the speed of the 
relevant technological changes, and the level of professional knowledge used for the design, and 
the complexity of the component itself. The technologically sophisticated complex component 
may be still outsourced if the OEM does not have the technological capability to design and 
manufacture it (an example is car audio equipment). This variable controls such negative 
correlation between the complexity and sourcing of a component, based on a division of labor. 
The variable safety indicates how important the component is for the safety of the car, the 
                                                  
8 The  variable specificity is defined by (6 - the degree of industry-wide standardization). The latter 
variable indicates how the interface of the component is clearly specified and how design 
specifications are standardized in the industry as a whole, as shown in Appendix Table A3.   12
variable  customer-value indicates the value of the component (price cost margin) and its 
contribution to the marketability of the automobile. The variable firm-standard indicates the 
level of standardization of the interface, technology, manufacturing method, and design 
standards within a firm.   
In addition, we use the level as well as the change of the total volume of vehicle 
production of the OEM. The former is included to examine how the degree of scale economy of 
an OEM might affect the choice. The latter (annual change (%) in production volume on the 
average over the previous three years) is included to examine how the OEM may use the choice 
to adjust for the change of production volume. Finally, we use 6 firm dummies and 6 year 
dummies to control firm level and year level fixed effects. We also introduce firm by year 
dummies for robustness check. 
  Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for these variables. Figure 5 depicts how the 
choice evolved over time in the industry as a whole in terms of simple arithmetic average of the 
choices over the entire sample components. The share of vertical integration as the dominant 
choice was around 8.8% in 1984 and gradually declined to 5.6% in 2002. Keiretsu sourcing 
accounted for around one third of the total procurements (35% in 1984 and 36% in 2002), and 
market sourcing accounted for 55 % to 61%. Figure 6 shows the relations between the choice 
and the three primary independent variables. It shows that the share of both vertical integration 
and keiretsu sourcing increases with specificity and interdependency. The share of market 
sourcing increases with testability, although this variable have significant negative correlations 
with specificity and interdependency (see Table A4)
9. Figure 7 shows the variation of these 
choices among 7 sample OEM firms with the size of their production volumes. It is clear that 
                                                  
9  As will be later shown, the partial positive correlation between market sourcing and 
testability is reversed in the regression model with multiple independent variables.   13
the share of keiretsu sourcing increases with the production volume, while such relationship is 
not observed for the share of vertical integration.   
                  (Table  1,  Figure  5,  Figure  6  and  Figure  7) 
4. Estimation Results 
Table 2 presents two basic estimations, with or without the interaction terms between specificity 
and testability and between specificity and interdependency. We use robust standard errors, to 
address potential heteroskedasticity. As shown in Model 1, the coefficients of both specificity 
and  interdependency have expected signs and significant coefficients, consistent with 
Proposition 1 and 2. Market sourcing is significantly less preferred to keiretsu sourcing for a 
component with high specificity (s) or high interdependency (θ ). Simultaneously, vertical 
integration is preferred to keiretsu sourcing when interdependency or specificity is important 
(although the latter effect is significant only at 10% level). In addition, the coefficient of 
interdependency is more than five times larger for the choice between vertical integration and 
keiretsu sourcing than the choice between market and keiretsu sourcing, while the coefficient of 
specificity is more than two times larger for the choice between vertical integration and keiretsu 
sourcing than the choice between market and keiretsu sourcing. Thus, specificity is a more 
important consideration for the choice between market and keiretsu sourcing, while 
interdependency is more an important consideration for the choice between vertical integration 
and keiretsu sourcing. This suggests that the hold-up risk due to specific investment can be 
often effectively controlled by a relational contracting based on keiretsu sourcing, while 
accommodating non-contractible design changes may often require vertical integration. 
  As for the variable testability, it does not have a significant coefficient for the choice 
between vertical integration and keiretsu choice as implied by Proposition 3, but it has a 
significantly negative coefficient for the choice between market sourcing and keiretsu sourcing,   14
implying that a firm prefers keiretsu sourcing to market sourcing significantly more, the higher 
the testability of the component. One interpretation for this result is that an OEM firm may 
prefer using keiretsu sourcing when the testability of the component is high, since the 
procurement of such component can provide large opportunities for a supplier to obtain useful 
information for promoting quality improvement and such information can be more easily shared 
with a keiretsu supplier than with a non-affiliated supplier. A keiretsu supplier may have both 
the incentive to gather information for quality improvement enabled by the high testability of 
the component and to share the information with the OEM for its implementation.   
  Let us turn to the coefficients of control variables. Complexity and safety promote the 
choice of keiretsu sourcing over both integration and market sourcing, although the effect of 
complexity on the choice between market and keiretsu is not significant. The quality of a 
component important for safety can generate significant externality for the other components, 
providing a reason for vertical integration. However, placing the supplier of such component 
within an OEM may dilute an incentive for safety due to multi-tasking. In this regard, the 
keiretsu supplier may have an advantage. On the other hand, customer-value promotes 
integration over keiretsu sourcing, and market sourcing over keiretsu. Firm-standard promote 
keiretsu sourcing over integration and over market sourcing, although the latter effect is not 
significant. Since standardization within a firm would facilitate the development of the 
documentations for specifications, it would enhance the contracting-out. Finally, the production 
volume favors keiretsu sourcing over market sourcing, which indicates the importance of the 
economy of scale for keiretsu production. 
  As for firm dummies, a larger automobile manufacturer (Toyota, Nissan and Honda) 
prefers keiretsu sourcing over market sourcing, even though the production volume is controlled. 
This may indicate a non-linearity of the effects of the production volume or other firm-specific   15
effects. As for the choice between vertical integration and keiretsu sourcing, Honda 
exceptionally disfavors integration. As for time dummies, we observe tendency toward keiretsu 
sourcing: increasing choice of keiretsu sourcing over both vertical integration and market 
sourcing (except for the choice between market sourcing over keiretsu in year 2002
10). 
  Let us turn to Model 2 with the interaction terms. Let us start with the interaction 
between specificity and testability. What the coefficient of the interaction term suggests is that 
while the specificity of a component favors vertical integration over keiretsu sourcing and 
keiretsu sourcing over market sourcing when testability is low, such preference declines as the 
testability of a component increases even though the relationship is not reversed. These results 
are consistent with the view that higher testability enables outsourcing even if the component is 
specific (see Proposition 1). As for the interaction between interdependency and specificity, it is 
not significant for either choice. The signs of the coefficients suggest that the interaction term 
tends to weaken the individual effects of specificity  and  interdependency, which is not 
consistent with their complementary effects. These results may reflect non-linearity (decreasing 
returns) of these individual effects. As for the control variables and the other variables, the 
estimation results are very similar to those for Model 1. 
Models3 to Model 5 of Table 3 inquire the robustness of the basic findings of Table 2. 
Model 3 uses only the cross section data of year 2002. Since our data on the engineering 
characteristics of the components are available only for recent years, using these data for much 
earlier years may cause biased estimates. The estimation results of Model 3, however, are highly 
consistent with those of Model 1. Specificity and interdependency promotes vertical integration 
over keiretsu sourcing, and specificity and testability promotes keiretsu sourcing over market 
                                                  
10  In the late 1990s some OEMs, such as Nissan and Mazda, discontinued their keiretsu relations 
with some suppliers by selling their stocks of the former keiretsu firms.   16
sourcing. Model 4 introduces the firm by year dummies, so as to control time variant missing 
variables at firm levels better, such as the potential changes of the engineering capability of an 
OEM firm over time. The estimation results, including the sizes of the estimated coefficients, 
are very similar to those of Model 1, suggesting that the combination of firm fixed effects, the 
time dummies and the level as well as the change of the production volumes of the OEMs 
effectively control the time variant missing variables at firm levels.   
Finally, Model 5 uses the sample of only three biggest OEMs of Japan: Toyota, Nissan 
and Honda. These firms are different from the other smaller OEMs in the sense that they have 
well developed keiretsu-supplier network (see Figure 7), so that they have more freedom and 
flexibility to choose the best organizational and contractual mode of component procurements. 
On the other hand, the other firms may have no choice but to use the keiretsu firms of three 
biggest OEMs (market sourcing by these other firms) , since their supplier networks are limited. 
The estimation results of Model 5 are, howeverɼhighly consistent with those of Model 1, with 
respect to the effects of specificity, interdependency and testability.  Specificity has become 
insignificant for the choice between vertical integration and keiretsu sourcing, suggesting that 
specificity does not matter for that choice by a firm with a well developed keiretsu network. The 
variable interdependency remains highly significant and has larger coefficients. Appendix 2 
shows the estimation results which focus on the choices in term of two alternatives and on the 
difference of their procurement shares. That is, we use the difference of the share of vertical 
integration and that of keiretsu sourcing as a dependent variable, focusing on the sample of the 
procurements involving no market sourcing, and the difference of the share of keiretsu sourcing 
and that of market sourcing as another dependent variable, focusing on the sample of the 
procurements using no vertical integration. The results for three key variables are very similar 
(See Table A5).     17
5. Conclusions and Discussions 
We have assessed the determinants of the choice among vertical integration, sourcing from 
keiretsu and sourcing from the market of 54 components by seven Japanese automobile 
manufacturers (OEMs) in light of contract economics for 7 every-three years from 1984 to 
2002.Our major findings are the following. First, consistent with transaction cost economics, the 
interdependency and (much lesser degree) specificity of a component make vertical integration 
preferred to keiretsu sourcing. Both of them also make the sourcing from keiretsu preferred to 
market sourcing. Second, interdependency is a significantly more important consideration for 
the choice between vertical integration and keiretsu sourcing than the choice between market 
and keiretsu sourcing, while the reverse is the case for specificity. This suggests that the hold-up 
risk due to specific investment can be often effectively controlled by a relational contracting 
based on keiretsu sourcing, while accommodating non-contractible design changes may often 
require vertical integration.     
Third, we have found that higher testability of a component significantly makes the 
effects of specificity smaller, consistent with the view that high testability of an output enables 
contracting of a component even with high design specificity. Separate from this effect, higher 
testability of a component also makes a firm prefer keiretsu sourcing over market sourcing. One 
interpretation of this result is that an OEM firm may prefer using keiretsu sourcing when the 
testability of the component is high, since the procurement of such component can provide large 
opportunities for a supplier to obtain useful information for promoting quality improvement and 
such information can be more easily shared with a keiretsu supplier than with a non-affiliated 
supplier. A keiretsu supplier may have both the incentive to gather information for quality 
improvement in the environment of high testability of the component and to share the 
information with the OEM for its implementation.     18
  Our empirical analysis also indicates several other interesting observations on the 
structure of supplier system. Larger volume production by an OEM and more standardization 
within the firm promote keiretsu sourcing both over market sourcing and over vertical 
integration, which may indicate the importance of the economy of scale and scope base for the 
development of keiretsu network. In addition, the scale of an OEM does not affect the share of 
the components supplied by in-house suppliers. Furthermore, safety concern promotes the 
choice of keiretsu sourcing over both market sourcing and vertical integration.   
  There are, however, several remaining issues. First, we do not consider the value of 
multiple mode procurement policy. We have simply assumed that there is a single best mode of 
procurement for each component, even though multiple mode procurement policy may be the 
optimal policy. An OEM takes into account the importance of preserving procurement 
competition in selecting suppliers. Second, we have assumed the exogeneity of the engineering 
characteristics of the components, which are constructed from the surveys on the engineers of 
four OEMs. However, we may expect that these characteristics are affected by the 
organizational or contract characteristics, e.g. whether a supplier is vertically integrated or not. 
Third, further analysis would be needed to search for the optimal boundary of firms, with 
respect to creation of new information and innovation. Our analysis suggests a view that a 
keiretsu system may have a certain advantage in generating the incentives for both autonomous 
innovation and collaboration with an OEM. An interesting question would be how the keiretsu 
system would survive in the environment of “open” innovation.  19
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Appendix1: Description of the Data 
1. Sources 
The data on component transactions between Japanese OEMs and suppliers were 
compiled from “Jidosha Buhin 200 Hinmoku Seisan-Ryutsu Chosa [Report on Production and 
Transactions of 200 Auto Components]”, published every three years by IRC, a Japanese market 
research company. The report provides the information on which OEMs purchased how much 
(in volume) of each component from which suppliers, including in-house divisions, for their 
domestic operation for the year (see Table A1 for an example), covering approximately 200 
types of components. We analyze seven OEMs (Toyota, Nissan, Honda, Mazda, Suzuki, 
Daihatsu, and Fuji Heavy Industry), all of which have manufactured mainly passenger cars and 
light trucks. Other Japanese OEMs that have manufactured heavy trucks are not included in our 
analysis.  
Among about 200 components, we picked up 54 components that were covered by the 
report throughout the period we analyzed (from 1984 to 200). Table A2 lists the components 
included in the dataset.     
To measure the characteristics of these components, a questionnaire survey was 
carried out with four Japanese OEMs (anonymous due to our confidential agreement). The 
survey was conducted between winter 2003 and summer 2004 jointly by Kentaro Nobeoka 
(Kobe University), Seiji Manabe (Yokohama National University), and Akira Takeishi. The 
engineers from four firms answered for each of the 54 components the questions about various 
dimensions of component characteristics mostly based on 5-point Likert-scale (See Table A3 for 
the questions to measure each variable of component characteristics). 
   22
2. Definition of Keiretsu Suppliers 
  As for the definition of keiretsu suppliers, we use the definition by IRC, whose report 
shows if a particular supplier is a keiretsu supplier of a particular OEM. According to IRC, 
while the financial tie (stock ownership) is the most important factor to define keiretsu 
relationships, other factors such as sales dependency, director dispatch, and historical 
relationships, are also taken into consideration. For example, even without financial tie, a 
supplier is heavily dependent in sales for a long period upon a particular OEM and the industry 
generally sees the supplier as a keiretsu supplier of the OEM, it is a keiretsu supplier of the 
OEM in IRC’s definition. Although IRC does not have an objective, well-defined definition of 
keiretsu suppliers, we think their definition captures well the actual perceptions shared by 
practitioners in the industry, which should be relevant in the make-or-buy decisions by OEMs. 
To define and use alternative, more objective definition is one of the next steps we would like to 
take in the future (see, for example, Lincoln, Gerlach, and Takahashi 1992 for discussion of 
Japanese keiretsu networks).     23





Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
               
Non-integration Integration
"spot" market sourcing




Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.Min Max
Choice 2603 2.49 0.63 1 3
VIKR 591 -0.63 0.71 -1.00 1.00
MRKR 2275 0.28 0.88 -1.00 1.00
specificity 2603 3.90 0.96 1.50 5.00
spectest 2603 13.28 3.80 4.88 20.42
interdepent 2603 3.89 0.54 2.34 4.84
intdpntspec 2603 15.30 4.71 4.73 24.22
testability 2603 3.45 0.67 2.00 4.67
complexity 2603 2.88 0.74 1.36 4.82
safety 2603 3.71 1.04 1 5
custmvalue 2603 3.55 0.86 1.88 5.88
firmstndrd 2603 3.63 0.53 2.35 4.6
prdvlm 2603 1.38 1.03 0.42 4.22
prdvlmchg 2603 1.44 8.58 -21.34 20.73
TYT 2603 0.15 0.35 0 1
NSN 2603 0.14 0.35 0 1
HND 2603 0.14 0.35 0 1
MZD 2603 0.14 0.35 0 1
SZK 2603 0.14 0.35 0 1
DHT 2603 0.14 0.35 0 1
FHI 2603 0.14 0.35 0 1
YR87 2603 0.14 0.35 0 1
YR90 2603 0.14 0.35 0 1
YR93 2603 0.15 0.35 0 1
YR96 2603 0.14 0.35 0 1
YR99 2603 0.15 0.35 0 1
YR02 2603 0.14 0.35 0 1  24
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Figure 6    Make-or-Buy Choices over Component Characteristics 
 
Note.    Low: lowest 25%, High: highest 25% 
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Table 2 Basic Estimation Results (Multinomial Logistic Regression) 
 
Model 1(Multinomial Model with no interactions) Model 2(Multinomial Model with interactions)
Coef. Rob. Std. Err. Coef. Rob. Std. Err. Coef. Rob. Std. Err. Coef. Rob. Std. Err.
specificity 0.63 0.37 * -1.38 0.09 *** 8.778 2.542 *** -4.724 0.950 ***
　specificity　×
testability -1.445 0.459 *** 0.779 0.141 ***
interdependency 1.87 0.31 *** -0.35 0.12 *** 5.103 1.999 ** -0.695 0.654
  interdependency
×specificity -0.673 0.443 0.106 0.159
testablity -0.03 0.13 -0.58 0.09 *** 6.611 2.064 *** -3.745 0.579 ***
complexity -0.72 0.19 *** -0.12 0.10 -0.487 0.175 *** -0.211 0.104 **
safety -0.24 0.10 ** -0.22 0.06 *** -0.187 0.087 ** -0.219 0.062 ***
custmvalue 1.01 0.19 *** 0.31 0.10 *** 0.796 0.179 *** 0.277 0.099 ***
firmstndrd -0.42 0.18 ** -0.10 0.10 -0.458 0.181 ** -0.150 0.108
prdvlm -0.22 0.48 -0.64 0.31 ** -0.204 0.485 -0.650 0.314 **
prdvlmchg 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.016 0.009 0.009
TYT -0.12 1.51 -1.74 0.99 * -0.092 1.536 -1.784 0.987 *
NSN -0.06 0.73 -1.90 0.48 *** -0.017 0.750 -1.935 0.478 ***
HND -2.05 0.53 *** -1.71 0.29 *** -2.023 0.541 *** -1.741 0.293 ***
MZD -0.20 0.41 -0.84 0.25 *** -0.173 0.424 -0.867 0.250 ***
SZK -0.03 0.43 -0.21 0.24 -0.030 0.440 -0.219 0.238
DHT 0.55 0.34 -0.46 0.21 ** 0.569 0.351 -0.482 0.213 **
YR87 0.00 0.32 0.07 0.20 -0.016 0.328 0.073 0.202
YR90 -0.22 0.34 -0.01 0.22 -0.234 0.351 -0.008 0.217
YR93 -0.27 0.41 -0.17 0.22 -0.275 0.415 -0.169 0.222
YR96 -0.64 0.35 * -0.29 0.21 -0.655 0.362 * -0.285 0.208
YR99 -0.54 0.35 -0.29 0.20 -0.552 0.360 -0.291 0.203
YR02 -0.60 0.37 0.10 0.21 -0.621 0.376 * 0.105 0.207
_cons -10.55 2.30 *** 11.76 0.89 *** -48.689 11.287 *** 25.704 4.014 ***
Number of obs   =       2603  Number of obs   =   2603    
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  Table 3 Estimation Results for Robustness Check 
 
Coef. Rob. Std. Err. Coef. Rob. Std. Err. Coef. Rob. Std. Err. Coef. Rob. Std. Err. Coef. Rob. Std. Err. Coef. Rob. Std. Err.
specificity 1.955 0.649 *** -1.126 0.208 *** 0.632 0.374 * -1.392 0.087 *** -0.085 0.319 -1.215 0.082 ***
interdependency 2.737 1.221 ** -0.523 0.328 1.890 0.308 *** -0.356 0.123 *** 2.362 0.538 *** -0.509 0.174 ***
testablity 0.395 0.452 -0.593 0.241 ** -0.031 0.132 -0.586 0.089 *** -0.152 0.173 -0.800 0.129 ***
complexity -0.751 0.474 0.050 0.257 -0.723 0.194 *** -0.115 0.105 -1.148 0.232 *** -0.773 0.153 ***
safety -0.261 0.300 -0.001 0.154 -0.246 0.102 ** -0.224 0.063 *** 0.089 0.114 -0.323 0.085 ***
custmvalue 0.641 0.629 0.071 0.248 1.024 0.191 *** 0.314 0.099 *** 0.953 0.238 *** 0.841 0.137 ***
firmstndrd 0.041 0.496 -0.199 0.285 -0.432 0.184 ** -0.104 0.106 -0.730 0.256 *** -0.412 0.156 ***
TYT -0.828 1.125 -3.611 0.556 ***
NSN -0.463 1.065 -1.799 0.522 ***
HND -1.896 1.244 -2.075 0.515 *** firm by time dummies firm by time dummies
MZD 0.570 0.992 -0.547 0.540
SZK -0.545 1.211 -0.825 0.518
DHT 1.245 0.975 -0.503 0.557
_cons -22.736 6.340 *** 10.947 2.368 ***
Number of obs   =        376
Log pseudolikelihood = -223.17 Pseudo R2 = 0.2845 Log pseudolikelihood = -1594.78       Pseudo R2    =  0Log pseudolikelihood =  -748.29          Pseudo R2   =   0.2313
Note  The coefficients for the firm by year dummies are not reported.
 Number of obs   =       2603
Vertical integration/ Keiretsu Market/Keiretsu
 Number of obs   =      1115
Market/Keiretsu
Firm dummies
(or firm by year
dummies)
Vertical integration/





Model 5 (Multinomial Model with firm by year dummies; Toyota,
Nissan and Honda)
Model 4 (Multinomial Model with firm by year
dummies) Model 3(Multinomial Model, cross-section for 2002)  29
 
 
Table A1 Example of IRC Data 
(the case of “changeable-timing valve unit” in 2002) 











Fuji Heavy Industry Denso 8.0
*=keiretsu supplier of the OEM





Table A2 Components Included in the Data 
ENGINE (INDUCTION / 1 Exhaust Manifolds
EXHAUST COMPONENTS) 2 Mufflers
ENGINE (LUBRICATION / 3 Water Pumps





ENGINE (ELECTRONIC 9 Alternators




ENGINE (FUEL SYSTEM 14 Carburetors
COMPONENTS) 15 Fuel Tanks
16 Fuel Tubes
ENGINE (MAIN BODY 17 Engine Bearings
COMPONENTS) 18 Crankshafts (Cast+ Forged) 
19 Connecting Rods
20 Cylinder Head Gaskets
21 Pistons
SUSPENSION COMPONENT 22 Suspension Ball Joints
23 Shock Absorbers
24 Stabilizers
STEERING COMPONENTS 25 Steering Wheels
26 Power Steering Systems




31 Torque Control Levers
32 Propeller Shafts
WHEELS / TIRES 33 Aluminum Wheels
34 Steel Wheels
35 Tires
EXTERIOR TRIM COMPON 36 Windshield Washers
37 Window Regulators
38 Glass




43 Windshield Wiper Assy




48 Lever Combination Switches
49 Wire Harnesses
INTERIOR TRIM COMPONE 50 Sun Visors
51 Seat Belts
52 Power Seats / Seats (for passenger and commercial vehicles)
OTHERS 53 Air Conditioning Systems
54 Audio Systems  31
































































                 Note:  the  questions  in the survey to measure each variable are shown. 


















The connections between this component and other components
(the interfaces with other components) have been clearly
standardized as a set of rules within your company.
˔
II-2
The connections between this component and other components
(the interfaces with other components) have been standardized
and shared across your company.
˔
II-3
The connections between this component and other components
(the interfaces with other components) have been clearly
standardized as a set of rules within the industry. (*reversed
˔
II-4
Techniques and methods for manufacturing the main part of this
component have been standardized within your company. ˔
II-5
Criteria for designing the main part of this component (such as its
dimension, strength and the materials to be used) have been
standardized within your company.
˔
II-6
The main part of this component has been standardized and
shared across your company. ˔
II-7
Criteria for designing the main part of this component have been
standardized within the industry. (*reversed scale) ˔
III-1
This component is designed to perform a particular function only
when combined with other components. ˔
III-2
When designing this component, its connections with other
components have to be considered and adjusted carefully. ˔
III-3
The function of this component is self-contained. (It has little
interdependency with other components).  (*reversed scale) ˔
III-4
This component is structurally connected and interdependent with
other components. ˔
III-5
A high degree of accuracy and precision is needed for this
component when combined with other components (at the design
and manufacturing levels) in order to ensure best performance
˔
III-6
A high degree of accuracy and precision is needed for this
component when combined with other components (at the design
and manufacturing levels) in order to achieve a better layout.
˔
III-7
When mounting this component or combining it with other




Advanced technology is used in this component.
˔
IV-2
The technology used in this component is fast-changing.
˔
IV-3
Highly sophisticated expertise is needed for designing this
component. ˔
IV-4
This is an important safety component which greatly affects the
safety of the vehicle. ˔
IV-5
The quality of this component can be assured independently of
other components. ˔
IV-6
Prototype testing can be conducted independently of other
components. ˔
IV-7
It is not easy to achieve the function and performance required for
this component. ˔
IV-8
This component is comprised of many subcomponents.
˔
IV-9
This component is structurally complex.
˔
IV-10
The function and performance required for this component are
complex (multidimensional). ˔
IV-11
The function and performance required for this component are




It is difficult to manufacture this component in terms of quality
and yield.  (*reversed scale) ˔
IV-13
When designing this component, manufacturing requirements
have to be carefully taken into consideration. ˔
IV-14
This component offers relatively high value (selling
price/manufacturing cost) compared to other auto components. ˔
IV-15
The quality of this component greatly affects the marketability of
the end product (vehicle). ˔  32


























MRKR 0.768 0.751 1
specificity -0.385 -0.133 -0.359 1.00
spectest -0.309 -0.160 -0.323 0.729 1
interdepent -0.222 0.094 -0.104 0.309 0.015 1
intdpntspec -0.405 -0.044 -0.320 0.899 0.553 0.684 1
testability 0.041 -0.055 -0.006 -0.263 0.455 -0.365 -0.375 1
complexity -0.096 0.086 -0.018 0.129 0.013 0.418 0.292 -0.202 1
safety -0.015 -0.021 -0.031 -0.111 -0.037 0.025 -0.080 0.078 0.176 1
custmvalue -0.175 0.119 -0.056 0.202 0.168 0.491 0.371 -0.065 0.703 0.271 1
firmstndrd 0.160 -0.021 0.102 -0.368 -0.210 -0.199 -0.386 0.173 -0.065 0.272 -0.113 1
prdvlm -0.318 -0.299 -0.418 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.003 1
prdvlmchg 0.042 0.043 0.057 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.032 1
TYT -0.239 -0.214 -0.310 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.007 0.885 0.086
NSN -0.169 -0.151 -0.215 0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.197 -0.208
HND -0.024 -0.126 -0.092 -0.007 -0.001 0.000 -0.005 0.007 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 0.009 -0.068 0.043
MZD 0.044 0.044 0.068 0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.004 0.002 -0.004 -0.147 -0.132
SZK 0.135 0.140 0.178 -0.001 0.000 -0.006 -0.004 0.002 -0.004 0.002 -0.002 0.006 -0.208 0.234
DHT 0.081 0.162 0.161 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.008 -0.312 0.092
FHI 0.172 0.146 0.211 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.354 -0.114
YR87 -0.006 0.016 0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.007 0.044 -0.108
YR90 -0.008 0.001 -0.007 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.107 0.199
YR93 -0.017 -0.012 -0.018 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.007 -0.037 -0.548
YR96 0.003 -0.019 -0.014 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.007 -0.043 0.266
YR99 -0.005 -0.016 -0.008 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.007 -0.062 0.037
YR02 0.040 0.015 0.043 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.030 0.125   
 
Note.    We do not report the correlations among dummy variables.   33
Appendix 2.  Estimation results focusing on the choices over two alternatives in terms of the 
difference of procurement shares 
This appendix reports the results of the estimations using the ordinary least squares model on the choice over 
two alternatives: that between vertical integration and keiretsu sourcing and that between keiretsu sourcing 
and market sourcing. The motivation for this exercise is that a firm may not have three alternatives for its 
choice. In addition, we use the difference of the shares of two alternatives in procurements, rather than a 
binary variable as dependent variables:     
There are two dependent variables: (1) the difference between the internal procurement share and 
the keiretsu sourcing share by firm i in time t for the component j which does not use market sourcing 
( t j i VIKR , , ) and (2) the difference between the market procurement share and the keiretsu sourcing share by 
firm i in time t for the component j which does not use vertical integration ( t j i MRKR , , ): 
) , , ,
, , int , ( /
, , ,
, , , , ,
t j i t i t i
i j j j t j i t j i
s yeardummie s firmdummie controls
crossterms ity testatibil cy erdependen y specificit g MRKR VIKR
ε
=
      ( a . 1 )  
  As shown in Table A5, the results are very similar to those in Table 2, as far as the coefficients for 
three key variables are concerned.   34
Table A5    Estimations assuming two alternatives for each choice between vertical integration and keiretsu sourcing and between keiretsu sourcing and 
market sourcing 
 
Model2 (OLS Model with no interactions) Model4(OLS Model with interactions)
Coef. Rob. Std. Err. Coef. Rob. Std. Err. Coef. Rob. Rob. Std. Err. Coef. Rob. Rob. Std. Err.
specificity 0.215 0.077 *** -0.334 0.015 *** -0.618 0.491 -0.473 0.157 ***
　specificity　×testability 0.092 0.091 0.093 0.028 ***
interdependency 0.193 0.063 *** -0.127 0.035 *** -0.385 0.221 * 0.105 0.130
  interdependency ×
specificity 0.134 0.057 ** -0.054 0.035
testablity 0.005 0.069 -0.154 0.024 *** -0.410 0.391 -0.514 0.100 ***
complexity 0.368 0.073 *** 0.022 0.028 0.347 0.074 *** 0.017 0.028
safety -0.147 0.044 *** -0.074 0.014 *** -0.143 0.043 *** -0.073 0.014 ***
custmvalue -0.079 0.072 0.059 0.026 ** -0.085 0.074 0.033 0.027
firmstndrd 0.060 0.053 -0.001 0.030 0.078 0.054 -0.016 0.031
prdvlm 0.064 0.147 -0.166 0.091 * 0.067 0.147 -0.167 0.090 *
prdvlmchg 0.000 0.006 0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.006 0.003 0.003
TYT -0.290 0.465 -0.678 0.284 ** -0.286 0.464 -0.675 0.283 **
NSN -0.291 0.236 -0.695 0.140 *** -0.292 0.236 -0.700 0.139 ***
HND -0.245 0.142 * -0.551 0.085 *** -0.258 0.142 * -0.553 0.084 ***
MZD -0.217 0.135 -0.208 0.070 *** -0.216 0.135 -0.210 0.070 ***
SZK 0.168 0.155 -0.047 0.061 0.175 0.156 -0.050 0.061
DHT 0.241 0.152 -0.081 0.052 0.248 0.152 -0.083 0.052
YR87 -0.039 0.093 0.028 0.057 -0.040 0.093 0.028 0.057
YR90 -0.062 0.102 -0.001 0.060 -0.064 0.102 -0.002 0.060
YR93 -0.080 0.117 -0.022 0.064 -0.083 0.117 -0.022 0.064
YR96 -0.046 0.110 -0.070 0.057 -0.045 0.110 -0.071 0.057
YR99 -0.044 0.113 -0.045 0.057 -0.046 0.113 -0.046 0.057
YR02 -0.084 0.119 0.080 0.055 -0.086 0.119 0.080 0.055
_cons -2.725 0.541 *** 3.111 0.219 *** 0.915 2.114 3.741 0.544 ***
Number of obs =     591  Number of obs =    2275 Number of obs   =  591  Number of obs =    2275
 R-squared     =  0.2304  R-squared     =  0.3695 R-squared     =  0.2338  R-squared     =  0.3728
Vertical integration - Keiretsu Market - Keiretsu Vertical integration - Keiretsu Market - Keiretsu